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A tanulmány azt vizsgálja, hogy milyen szerepet játszott a termelékenységnövekedés és a 
pénzügyi környezet az elmúlt évek magyar gazdasági növekedésében. Ehhez egy 
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lassulását főként a termelékenység magyarázza, míg a külső pénzügyi környezet szigorodása 
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1 Introduction
Neoclassical growth theory predicts conditional convergence, which means that a country that
starts below its long-run level of capital will grow faster for a while. The prediction also applies
when there is fast productivity increase due to the importing of better technologies, organization
practices, or institutions. The so-called new member states of the European Union have expe-
rienced convergence for a combination of these reasons after the initial transition recessions of
the early 1990s.
The same is true for Hungary, whose GDP per capita has risen from below 50% of the German
level in 1995 to about 64% in 2016, calculated at current purchasing power parities. The speed of
convergence, however, has been very uneven. After a brief slowdown in 1996, Hungarian growth
was strong until 2006. Afterwards, however, convergence stopped for almost a decade, partly due
to the global nancial and subsequent Euro crises between 2008-2012. Growth resumed after
2012, and Hungary is again on an income convergence path. As we show below, however, the
recent pick up in GDP per capita growth has been driven mostly by increases in employment. If
one focuses on GDP per hours worked, growth has still not returned to pre 2006 levels.
In this paper we study two possible explanations for the slowdown in Hungarian growth.
The rst explanation is a productivity growth decline, and the second is a credit crunch. Using
empirical measures of total factor productivity and the sovereign interest premium, we docu-
ment that both explanations are qualitatively consistent with events after 2006. The question
is whether the productivity or nance based explanations - individually or jointly - are able to
explain the Hungarian growth experience quantitatively.
To evaluate this we build a small-open economy, neoclassical growth model with capital
accumulation, productivity convergence and a debt-dependent interest rate. We calibrate the
model to the Hungarian economy, and simulate the eects of two unexpected permanent shocks.
The rst is a slowdown in the rate of productivity convergence, and the second is an increase
in the debt elasticity of the interest rate on foreign borrowing. We discipline the exercise by
using empirically identied processes for both productivity (using the Solow residual), and for
the interest premium (using EMBI spreads).
Our results show that these two shocks are able to explain the major medium-term features
of the Hungarian growth experience. The model does a good job at matching growth facts both
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before and after the shocks hit. We nd that overall slow growth has been driven by TFP, but
the behavior of investment and the net foreign asset position cannot be understood without the
sustained increase in the interest premium.
Our paper is related to articles that study the roles of productivity vs. nance in explaining
growth volatility in emerging economies. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) stress the role of growth
shocks to explain the cyclical behavior of consumption and the trade balance. Estimating the
neoclassical model on Argentine data, García-Cicco, Pancrazi and Uribe (2010) nd that interest
premium shocks seem to be more important drivers of the Argentine experience. Subsequent
papers found dierent results for dierent countries. Naoussi and Tripier (2013) and Guerron-
Quintana (2013) nd that shocks to trend productivity are more important to explain growth
volatility in African countries than nancial shocks. For the so-called Visegrad countries of
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, Baksa and Kónya (2017) also conrms the
primary role of productivity shocks. In contrast, Tastan (2013) nds that in Turkey nancial
shocks are more important.
We contribute to this literature using a somewhat dierent modeling approach. While we also
rely on the neoclassical growth model, we focus on medium-term convergence instead of short-
run cyclicality. Our goal is to understand the fast convergence and subsequent sharp slowdown
in Hungary in a unied framework. Given our emphasis on convergence, we use the original,
non-linear version of the model, since linearized solutions are inaccurate when a country is far
from its steady state. We use the extended path solution method (Gagnon, 1990), which relies on
a series of deterministic simulations enhanced by unexpected temporary and permanent shocks.
We also dier from the literature in that we use identied processes for the interest pre-
mium and productivity as the main driving forces of the model. This is especially important for
the interest premium, which is typically identied from the behavior of consumption and the
trade balance in estimated linearized models (García-Cicco, Pancrazi and Uribe 2010). Using an
observed interest premium series puts additional discipline on the model, providing external val-
idation for the results. We also provide a useful and highly tractable alternative to estimation.
Using only two observed shock processes we keep the model simple and transparent, while still
making it empirically grounded. The disadvantage is that we cannot perform formal statistical
tests. On the other hand, Hungarian time series are short, so the power of such tests is low. Our
approach yields important insights when estimation is either not feasible or not reliable.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the
Hungarian growth experience between 1995-2018. Section 3 builds the model used for subse-
quent simulations. Section 4 details the choice of model parameters and the identication of the
productivity and interest premium processes. Section 5 describes the simulation exercise and
presents the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Convergence in Hungary
In this section we present a few basic facts about Hungarian growth between 1995-2017. Due
to data limitations, we will later restrict attention to the sub-period 1999-2016. Looking at the
earlier years of 1995-1998, however, adds useful context to the subsequent period. Also note
that the transition recession in Hungary lasted between 1990-1993, and there was substantial
scal adjustment in 1996. By 1999, however, the Hungarian economy was along what was then
thought to be a fast, sustainable convergence path.
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Figure 1: Hungarian growth facts, 1995-2017
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Figure 1 plots four indicators for the Hungarian economy: the growth rate of real GDP, the
employment rate, the investment rate and the net foreign asset position. The beginning of the
period is characterized by increasing growth, employment and investment, and a slowly deteri-
orating external investment position (driven primarily by foreign direct investment inows).
The second period, between about 2000-2005 is characterized by high growth, stable employ-
ment, slowing investment, and a dramatic worsening of the net foreign asset position (driven
primarily by public and private debt). The period between 2006-2013 is a long recession, with
low or negative growth rates, a large decline in investment and employment, and external re-
balancing. Our main focus in this paper is no these two periods, rst with fast convergence
increasingly driven by a credit boom, and then a massive slowdown accompanied by signicant
external adjustment.
Finally, the years between 2014-2017 saw a return to higher growth rates, accompanied by
higher but erratic investment rates, and by continuing balance sheet adjustment. Note that the
last period is also characterized by a large and sustained increase in employment. We show later
that productivity growth in Hungary is still disappointingly low. These two developments may
be partly explained by the fact that a signicant part of employment growth is in public works
projects, whose economic value is questionably (Fazekas and Varga, 2015). While investment is
recovering, it is to a signicant degree driven by European Union structural funds (Baksa and
Kónya, 2017) and government investment. The eects of EU funding can be seen in 2016, when
there was a temporary lull in inows.
Arguably Hungary is returning to a faster convergence path in 2017-2018. Employment
growth is increasingly driven by the private sector, and corporate investment is picking up. On
the other hand, the country is experiencing a housing boom along with quickly increasing hous-
ing prices. Since our data used in the subsequent sections ends in 2016, we do not need to take
a stand on the sustainability of the current high growth rates.
As we explained in the Introduction, we focus on the roles of productivity growth and the
external nancial environment measured by the foreign interest premium. In what follows we
ignore two additional drivers of Hungarian growth. The rst is scal policy, which was thought
to be behind the slowdown of GDP growth in 2006. It is dicult to model scal policy realistically
in the neoclassical framework, and there are signs that the impact of the scal adjustment would
have been temporary in the absence of the global nancial crisis starting in 2008.
5
Second, we ignore employment and focus on labor productivity in our model. The increase
in employment starting in 2013 is at least partly driven by government policy targeting labor
supply, which would add an additional exogenous driving force to the model (at least between
2013-2016). While it would be desirable for our model to endogenously generate the large decline
in employment in 2009, it turns out to be dicult to model the labor market in a way that matches
both its cyclical component and its convergence behavior. We do use employment and hours in
the measurement of total factor productivity, but we leave the proper modeling of labor supply
for future research.
3 The model
The model is a variant of the small open economy neoclassical growth model. We work with the
sequential markets, decentralized version of the model, which facilitates the calibration exercise
later. Households consume, invest and save. A discount bond is available through which house-
holds can borrow and save on international nancial markets. Firms borrow capital and labor
from households on competitive factor markets, and sell them a single consumption/investment
nal good, also on a competitive market. We normalize the price of the nal good to unity, and
use Wt and rkt to denote the wage rate and the rental rate of capital, respectively.
3.1 Households and rms
The representative household solves the following inter-temporal problem:
maxEt
∞∑
t=0
βt logCt
s.t.
Bt+1
Rt
−Bt = WtNt + rktKt − Ct − It
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +
[
1− φ
2
(
It
gIt−1
− 1
)2]
It,
where Ct is consumption, Bt is the amount of foreign bonds that matures at t, Nt is the supply
of labor, Kt is the stock of physical capital available for production at t, and It is investment.
Capital accumulation is subject to investment adjustment costs as in Christiano, Eichenbaum
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and Evans (2005). We choose this specication instead of capital adjustment costs because it
can account for the gradual response of investment in response to shocks. Since the model will
have a balanced growth path where the common growth rate is g, we write the investment cost
function such that it is zero along the BGP. We assume that households have a time endowment
of 1, and since they do not value leisure, labor supply is Nt = 1.
The rst-order conditions of the problem are straightforward, and are given as
1
Ct
= βRtEt
1
Ct+1
qt = 1 +
φ
2
(
It
gIt−1
− 1
)2
+ φ
(
It
gIt−1
− 1
)
It
gIt−1
− βφEt
(
It+1
gIt
− 1
)(
It+1
gIt
)2 Ct
Ct+1
qt+1
qt = βEt
[
rkt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1
] Ct
Ct+1
.
The rst equation is the Euler equation corresponding to foreign bonds. The second equation
describes the evolution of investment. The third condition is the arbitrage between bond and
capital investment.
Firms produce with a standard Cobb-Douglas production function using capital and labor:
Yt = e
tAtK
α
t (XtNt)
1−α .
We assume that productivity has three components. First, Xt stands for deterministic, labor
augmenting productivity that grows at the gross rate of g = Xt/Xt−1. Second, we allow for
catch-up productivity growth towards the steady state, captured by the termAt. Given an initial
level A0, this term follows and exogenous, autoregressive process:
at = ρtat−1, (1)
where at = logAt and as we discuss later, we allow the convergence coecient ρ to change
over time. Finally, we allow for a stochastic shock t, which is assumed to be an i.i.d. white noise
process.
The crucial - and nonstandard - component in this setup is the convergence term at. We use
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this specication to allow for transition growth apart from capital accumulation. Many authors
have documented that the main reason for underdevelopment is low productivity (Caselli, 2005;
Hall and Jones, 1999; Kónya, 2018). Since explicitly modeling the diusion of knowledge would
be complicated, we simply assume an exogenous process. The important assumption is that this
is known by agents, and productivity catch-up is built into expectations. In our main exercise
one of the key shocks to hit the economy is an unexpected, permanent change in this process.
The rst-order conditions are again straightforward, and are given by
rkt = α
(
Kt
XtNt
)α−1
Wt = (1− α)Xt
(
Kt
XtNt
)α
.
Both labor and capital are employed so that their marginal products equal their price.
3.2 Equilibrium
It is well-known that with an exogenous interest rate small open economy models are not sta-
tionary. We follow the literature (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2003) and assume that the interest
rate Rt depends on the net foreign asset position as follows:
Rt =
g
β
eυt
υt = ρrυt−1 − ψt
(
Bt
Yt
− by
)
+ rt , (2)
where υt is the interest premium by is the long-run, exogenously given sustainable debt position,
and ψ is the debt elasticity of the interest premium (which can change over time). Note that
we deviate from the typical specication in two ways. First, we use the NFA/GDP position (as
opposed to the NFA level) as a measure of indebtedness. This is mostly innocuous, but we think it
is closer to the idea that the premium captures (in a reduced form way) the perceived probability
of default. Second, we add an autoregressive term to the premium function. This will to capture
the fact that the Hungarian interest premium was declining during the early 2000s, while the
NFA position was worsening. This can be explained by our specication with an initial premium
that is above its level conditional on indebtedness. Note that we set the steady state level of the
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external interest rate to coincide with the implicit domestic one.
Since productivity has a deterministic trend, we normalize growing variables by the growth
factor Xt. Let ct = Ct/Xt, it = It/Xt, kt = Kt/Xt, bt = Bt/Xt and yt = Yt/Xt. Combining
the household and rm conditions and using the normalized variables, we get the following
conditions:
1 = eυtEt
ct
ct+1
qt = 1 +
φ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2
+ φ
(
it
it−1
− 1
)
it
it−1
− β
g
φEt
(
it+1
it
− 1
)(
it+1
it
)2 ct
ct+1
qt+1
qt =
β
g
Et
[
αyt+1
kt+1
+ (1− δ) qt+1
]
ct
ct+1
gkt+1 = (1− δ) kt +
[
1− φ
2
(
it
it−1
− 1
)2]
it (3)
βe−υtbt+1 = yt + bt − ct − it
yt = e
teatkαt
υt = ρrυt−1 − ψ
(
bt
yt
− by
)
+ rt
rkt =
αyt
kt
wt = (1− α) y
Rt =
g
β
eυt
The set of equations (3) characterize the competitive equilibrium for the price sequences {υt}∞t=0,
{Rt}∞t=0, ,
{
rkt
}∞
t=0
, {wt}∞t=0, {qt}∞t=0 and the allocation sequences {ct}∞t=0, {it}∞t=0, {kt}∞t=0,
{bt}∞t=0, {yt}∞t=0. Initial conditions for the endogenous and exogenous state variables are given
by k0, b0, υt, a0. It is easy to show (see next section) that there is a unique, deterministic steady
state to which the system would converge in the absence of stochastic shocks.
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4 Calibration and shock processes
The model economy is driven by (i) convergence dynamics due to capital accumulation and pro-
ductivity convergence, and (ii) exogenous shocks to productivity and the interest premium. One
of the main contributions of our paper is that empirically observed processes for productivity
and the interest premium generate convergence dynamics in line with the data. In this section
we detail the choice of the model parameters and the identication of the two processes.
4.1 Data
We use the following annual time series for the Hungarian economy between 1999-2016.
GDP Chain linked gross domestic product, base year 2011. Source: Eurotat.
Investment Gross xed capital formation, chain linked, base year 2011. Source: Eurostat
Capital stock Total (net) xed assets at current replacement cost. Source: Eurostat
Net foreign assets Net foreign asset position as a percentage of GDP. Source: Eurostat
Interest premium JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Indicator (EMBI) spread. Source: World
Bank
Population Total population. Source: Penn World Table
Employment Total employment, national accounts, domestic concept. Source: Penn World
Table
Average hours Annual hours worked per worker. Source: Penn World Table
Capacity utilization Capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector. Source: Eurostat
Workfare employment Number of workers in public workfare programs. Source: Eurostat,
Hungarian Statistical Oce.
Adjusted labor share Compensation of employees relative to value added, adjusted with the
number of self-employed. Source: AMECO.
There are a number of issues that arise when using the data above. First, the measurement of
the capital stock is problematic. This is documented in many papers, and authors often choose
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to compile their own capital stock estimates using the perpetual inventory method (PIM). In the
context of Hungary and other transition economies, however, the choice of an initial capital stock
(which is necessary for the PIM procedure) is far from innocuous. A recent paper (Levenko, Oja
and Staehr, 2019) highlights many of the issues that arise in Eastern European economies, and
presents its own estimates. While the levels are dierent, Figure A1 in their paper shows that the
dynamics of the capital-output ratio are very similar across the authors’ estimates, and publicly
available data from the Eurostat and AMECO. Since for the calculation of total factor productivity
growth only the dynamics matter, we simply work with the Eurostat series. Apart from being
publicly available, another advantage of the Eurostat series is that it is consistent with data on
the labor share (see the next section). The only limitation is that data ends in 2016, so this is the
last year we can include in our sample.
Total factor productivity measurement also needs labor input. We rely on the Penn World Ta-
ble for employment and hours worked. We use the PWT because hours worked in Eurostat have
a structural break in 2010, when there is a one-time, steep drop in the series. This is acknowl-
edged by the Hungarian Statistical Oce, but they do not calculate hours before the break with
the new methodology. The Penn World Table average hours do not have this problem, implying
that there is an adjustment in the PWT that corrects for the break.
In addition to hours, the measurement of total employment is also problematic. After 2010
the number of people participating in workfare programs has increased signicantly, reaching
a peak of about 5% of total employment by 2015. There is a strong perception that Hungarian
workfare jobs are unproductive (Fazekas and Varga, 2015). They tend to involve people with very
low skills, and employ them in a way that contributes very little to GDP. The workfare scheme is
essentially a social program, so we simply subtract these people from the employment statistics.
Capacity utilization is important for the calculation of productivity (Basu, 1996). Unfortu-
nately, there is no economy-wide utilization measure, but Eurostat reports utilization for man-
ufacturing. It is possible to use other proxies (Kónya, 2018), but here we follow Levenko at al.
(2019) and simply assume that the manufacturing statistics applies to the broader economy.
Finally, we use EMBI spreads to measure the external interest premium. There are alternative
indicators, such as sovereign CDS spreads, or domestic interest rates corrected by ination or
exchange rate changes. The advantage of the EMBI over CDS spreads is that for Hungary the
time series is longer, starting in 1999. Relative to domestic currency denominated assets, its main
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advantage is that it compares assets denominated in US dollars, so that exchange rate risk is not
an issue.
4.2 Calibration
For some of the parameters we choose values commonly used in the literature. In particular
we set the discount factor to β = 0.96, the depreciation rate to δ = 0.05 and the investment
adjustment cost parameter to φ = 10. Without loss of generality, we normalize the long run
level of productivity to a¯ = 1. The long run sustainable NFA/GDP position is set to by = 0, since
there is no obvious alternative value for the Hungarian economy and cross-country evidence is
also inconclusive.
We set the long-run growth rate to 0.01, which equals the average growth rate of GDP per
hours worked in Germany between 1995-2018. The capital elasticity of the production function is
set to α = 0.4, which equals one minus the adjusted labor share for the same period in Hungary.
Using the set of equilibrium conditions (3), it is easy to see that the capital-output ratio is
given by the steady state equations as
k¯
y¯
=
α
g/β − 1 + δ .
Given our calibration, this value equals k¯/y¯ = 3.98. Figure 2 plots the capital-output ratio
from Eurostat. It is signicantly higher during the rst two years of the sample period, but than
uctuates around 4, which is the steady state value we just calculated. The fact that Hungary
started the period with a higher capital-output ratio might sound counterintuitive at rst. Notice,
however, that many Eastern European economies were highly capital intensive during the period
of central planning. Therefore, it is not implausible that the capital-output ratio was still declining
in the rst decade of transition.
4.3 Shock identication
We use two empirically identied shock processes as exogenous model drivers. In this section
we detail how the productivity and premium processes are recovered from the data. Our main
exercise is to feed unexpected, permanent changes in these processes into our theoretical model.
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Figure 2: The capital-output ratio in Hungary
Therefore, we need to nd the breaks in the productivity and the premium sequences. As it turns
out, the data is very clear about breaks and we simply identify them by visual inspection. We
start with the components of productivity, and then turn to the interest premium.
4.3.1 Total factor productivity
We calculate total factor productivity as the Solow residual. Recall that total factor productivity
in our framework is dened as
TFPt = e
tAtX
1−α
t .
We can rewrite the production function to express TFP as a function of labor productivity to the
capital-output ratio:
TFPt =
(Yt/Nt)
1−α
(Kt/Yt)
α .
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To calculate TFP, we use the following augmented productivity function:
Y obst = TFPt ×
(
uobst K
obs
t
)α (
hobst L
obs
t
)1−α
,
where ut is capacity utilization, ht is annual hours per worker, and Lt is employment. Although
these are not modeled explicitly, they are important for the measurement exercise. Our aim is not
to reproduce the exact movements in output, but to see how it evolves over time given changes
in its long-run driver, productivity.
Once we identify the TFP series, we calculate the three components the following way. First,
the deterministic trend is simply given by Xt = gt, since we normalize X0 = 1. We create a
normalized series by dividing TFP withX1−αt . This series is depicted on Figure 3.1 It is clear that
there are two distinct regimes in Hungarian productivity convergence. The rst regime lasts
until 2005, and it is characterized by fast convergence. The second regime starts in 2006 and is
characterized by slow convergence.
To t these two periods, we use the specication of the At process given in eq. (1), and solve
for At = A0ρt. Then we simply use nonlinear least squares on the two subsamples 1999:2005
and 2006:2016 to nd the convergence parameters ρ1 = 0.962 and ρ2 = 0.997. Notice that
the productivity slowdown occurs before the global nancial crisis. We experimented with a
cuto date of 2008, but the productivity t in that case is obviously much worse. Also note that
controlling for hours and capacity utilization are sucient to eliminate a large fall in productivity
in 2009. This is an important reason to include these controls, since large falls in exogenous
productivity are dicult to explain.
Finally, we calculate the exogenous shocks t as the prediction errors of the (logged) non-
linear least squares t. Figure 4 plots the results.
4.3.2 The interest premium
We use EMBI spreads for Hungary to t the interest premium process dened by eq. (2). We esti-
mate this equation directly using an AR(1) specication with an additional explanatory variable,
the NFA/GDP ratio. As for productivity, we look for a permanent change in the process, and we
1The series should be interpreted relative to a steady state of 1. We implement this empirically by also calculat-
ing the TFP series for Germany, and use PPP GDP per capita in 2010 for Hungary and Germany to anchor relative
productivity in Hungary in that year. This essentially means that we construct a chain-linked productivity series for
Hungary at constant PPP, where German productivity in 2010 equals 1.
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Figure 3: Transition productivity
model this change as an increase in the debt elasticity of the interest premium ψ. Empirically,
we interact NFA/GDP with a dummy variable that equals one starting in 2009, the rst full year
of the global nancial crisis.
Figure 5 plots the evolution of the EMBI spread in Hungary. It is clear that there is a large
and persistent increase during the global nancial crisis. The precise timing is not clear from the
chart, since the spread started rising in 2008. We experimented with various cuto dates, and
chose 2009 as the best t. The estimated debt elasticities are given as ψ1 = 0.0054 for 1999-2008,
and ψ2 = 0.0279 for 2009-2016. We also estimate an autoregressive coecient of ρr = 0.49.
We calculate the exogenous premium shocks as the residuals to the estimated equation. The
results are shown on Figure 6. There are two things worth mentioning. First, we identify mostly
negative shocks until 2008. This is consistent with conventional wisdom, which considers the
pre-crisis years to be a time of easy borrowing. Second, the empirical model needs a large - but
temporary - shock in 2012 to explain the increase in the interest premium when the NFA/GDP
ratio was already increasing. Since 2012 was the peak of the Euro crisis, which was exogenous
15
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 e
rro
rs
Figure 4: Productivity shocks
to the Hungarian economy, a large positive premium shock is precisely what we would expect.
5 Results
In this section we use the two identied processes - productivity and the interest premium -
to see how well our model can match the growth experience of Hungary in the 1999-2016 pe-
riod. Afterwards, we run counterfactuals when we shut o one of the two structural changes we
estimated. First, we simulate the eect of the productivity slowdown only, and second, we sim-
ulate the eect of the risk premium increase. Essentially, we want to run a horse-race between
these two important drivers of the Hungarian growth experience after 2005, and see which one
contributed more to the observed dynamics of indebtedness, investment and GDP.
5.1 Solution method
We start by simulating the model given the calibrated parameters, the estimated coecients
from the productivity and interest premium processes, and the identied i.i.d. shocks t and
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Figure 5: EMBI spreads for Hungary
rt . We start the model from the actual initial conditions in 1999, and simulate the economy by
assuming that it converges to the unique deterministic steady state in the very long run. Since the
initial conditions are very far from the eventual steady state, we do not log-linearize the model
equations. Instead, we apply the so-called extended path method described in Gagnon (1990).
The method is an extension of the perfect foresight solution technique that uses the New-
ton method. It simplies the original stochastic, non-linear environment by assuming certainty
equivalence. At any given time t, agents are given initial conditions for endogenous and ex-
ogenous state variables, and they observe the two exogenous shocks (productivity and interest
premium). They assume that the economy will not be hit by new shocks in the future, which
is equivalent to assume certainty equivalence. Agents therefore choose plans - and in particu-
lar, pick time t choice variables - by solving a perfect foresight problem. The realized choices
for investment it, the capital stock kt and asset level bt are stored and become initial conditions
for period t + 1 decisions. When the next period arrives, agents again realize the new shocks
(t, 
r
t ) and again solve a perfect foresight problem generating endogenous variables for t + 1.
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Figure 6: Interest premium shocks
The simulation continues until we reach 2016, the last period for which we have data.
The perfect foresight simulations are carried out in DYNARE. The deterministic solution
method assumes that the economy converges to the steady state in nite time, and solves a
(large) system of equations using a version of the Newton method. Given the unique deter-
ministic convergence path, we can make the approximation error arbitrarily small by choosing
a distant enough point when the terminal conditions (being in the steady state) are imposed.
We select T = 400 as the length of each deterministic simulation, by which time the system is
indistinguishable from the steady state.
Note that at each time period we only store the rst element of the solution vector, since
the next period brings new shocks and therefore requires a new simulation. We assemble the
stochastic solution by combining these elements into a single time series. Also note that while
we impose certainty equivalence, the deterministic non-linear features of the model are fully
retained. Since we are interested in the convergence of a country far from its long-run steady
state, and because the error from ignoring precautionary saving tends to be small in this class
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of models, we believe that our solution method is the best compromise between speed, accuracy
and tractability.2
The model has three endogenous and two exogenous state variables. As initial conditions we
choose actual 1999 values, which are given by:
K1999
Y1999
= 4.788
I1999
Y1999
= 0.252
B1999
Y1999
= −0.689
A0 = 0.331
υ1999 = 0.0137.
In each subsequent period we use the previous period’s choices as initial conditions. Importantly,
while we have structural breaks in 2006 and 2009, we use the model to create the appropriate
initial conditions for capital, investment, the net foreign asset position, transition productivity,
and the interest premium. In other words, we rely on the model to endogenously update the state
variables in response to the unexpected, permanent changes to the productivity process and to
the interest premium function.
5.2 Growth simulation
We now present results from the model simulations. To recap, agents face unexpected, i.i.d.
productivity and risk premium shocks. In addition we introduce two unexpected, permanent
changes over time. First, the productivity convergence process - captured by the deterministic
dynamics of the variable At - slows drown dramatically after 2005. Second, the debt elasticity of
the external interest premium increases signicantly after 2008. The former change is specic
to the Hungarian economy, while the second is the local eect of the global nancial crisis. We
solve and simulate the model by the extended path method detailed in the previous section.
In addition to the stochastic model, we also run a deterministic simulation, where the only
2DYNARE can be downloaded from www.dynare.org. Although the software contains an explicit command for
extended path simulations, we chose to program the subsequent iterations using only the deterministic solver. Since
we only have 17 iterations between 1999-2016 (we use 1999 only for initial conditions), and each deterministic step
takes much less than a second even with our chosen planning horizon of 400 periods, the whole procedure is very
fast.
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shocks are the two unexpected, permanent changes. In other words, we simply shut down the
i.i.d. period shocks. We do this to see how much the long-run dynamics are inuenced by the
short-run shocks. Also, in the next section when we present counterfactuals, it is simpler to work
with the deterministic version of the model.
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Figure 7: Simulating the Hungarian economy
Figure 7 presents the results. We plot four time series: the NFA/GDP ratio, the investment
GDP ratio, the interest premium, and GDP pre capita normalized by trend growth Xt. In each
case, we plot simulations from the full stochastic model (“Model”), the deterministic model with
the two unexpected permanent changes (“No shocks”), and the data (“Data”). As explained earlier,
the interest premium is measured by the EMBI spread in the data.
Before we go into details, it is crucial to emphasize that we the two main driving forces -
productivity and the interest premium - are taken directly from the data, and are not calibrated
to match aggregate properties of the data. This is particularly true for the interest premium
function, which we assume is observable. The debt elasticities are direct estimates from the EMBI
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data, and are not targeted to match the forward-looking choices for investment and debt. While
productivity is measured by the Solow residual, the model misses some potentially important
factors such as endogenous labor supply and capacity utilization.
Given these, the model does a remarkably good job replicating key features of the Hungar-
ian growth experience. In particular, both the evolution of the net foreign asset position and
the investment rate are matched very well, although the model over-predicts the extent of in-
debtedness before the crisis. It does, however, do a very good job in capturing the balance sheet
adjustment after 2008. We also capture the evolution of the interest premium well, which is not
automatic given that we let the model predict the NFA position and not use the actual value from
the data in the interest premium function.
There are naturally discrepancies, which can easily be explained by factors missing from
the model. One such issue is the investment boom in 2014-2015. In a related paper (Baksa-
Kónya, 2017) we show that European Union structural funds have a very strong impact on the
aggregate investment rate post-2010, and in these two years EU fund inows were particularly
large. Another issue is the evolution of GDP per capita in the second half of the sample. While we
capture the slowdown well on average, GDP growth was stronger just before the crisis, weaker
during the crisis years, and stronger again in the last two years of the sample period. The rst
episode is due to a sharp rise in capacity utilization, and also to a slower than predicted actual
drop in capital accumulation. During the crisis, both capacity utilization and employment fell.
Finally, starting from 2013 employment has increased signicantly in Hungary, at least partly
driven by policy changes that encourage labor force participation.
Both capacity utilization and labor supply could be included into the model, but especially
the latter presents some modeling challenges. The standard model of labor-leisure choice, which
relies on an elastic labor supply, is generally considered to be a weakness of the neoclassical
growth model to deliver realistic responses to productivity and interest premium shocks (Baksa
and Kónya, 2017). In particular, it turns out to be dicult to have endogenous labor supply that
is consistent with both the business cycle and the convergence behavior of employment. To sum
up, we opted for the simplest and most robust specication that captures the long and medium
term trends, instead of matching short-run uctuations with many shocks and mechanisms.
Finally, let us briey discuss the impact of the stochastic i.i.d. shocks on Hungarian growth.
The main dierence is in the behavior of the interest premium and its impact on the net foreign
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asset position. Recall that before the crisis the premium shock is mostly negative, leading to a
somewhat higher level of debt than in the deterministic case. Also, in the absence of favorable
temporary premium shocks, the balance sheet adjustment would have started a year or two
earlier. Overall, however, the dierences are modest, and the deterministic model is not notably
worse in capturing the long-run dynamics of the Hungarian economy then the stochastic one.
5.3 Counterfactuals
Now we turn to our main question, which is to isolate the eects of the productivity growth slow-
down and the increase in the interest premium. To do this, we run two additional simulations.
First, we focus on the productivity slowdown after 2005, and assume that the debt elasticity of
the interest premium does not increase in 2009. This does not necessarily assume away the global
nancial crisis, since it may have contributed to the prolonged slow growth of productivity in
Hungary. We ignore only the direct eect of the crisis on borrowing costs. Second, mirroring the
rst counterfactual, we shut o the productivity channel and focus only on the nancial shock.
We present results from the deterministic case and ignore period shocks, since these were
identied from the observed behavior of productivity and the interest rate. In the absence of the
permanent shocks, it is unlikely that the stochastic components would have behaved exactly the
same way. Also, as we have shown above, the deterministic model is not signicantly worth in
explaining medium term dynamics in Hungary.
Figure 8 presents the results. In terms of economic growth, the dominant force is clearly the
productivity slowdown. The premium increase has only a marginal impact on the evolution of
GDP per capita after 2005. Our model is very simple and does not have nancial accelerator type
eects. It is nevertheless very unlikely that such eects would depress GDP growth for a decade.
The main reason for the lackluster growth performance of the Hungarian economy over the last
decade is the low growth of productivity.
The premium increase associated with the nancial crisis, however, had a signicant impact
on investment. Neither change alone can explain the deep drop in investment, but the premium
increase seems to be the more important component. As the rst panel shows, the interest pre-
mium increase is responsible for the speed of the balance sheet adjustment, and one way to de-
crease indebtedness is to cut back investment. Overall, while the main driver of growth seems to
have been productivity, the premium increase is responsible for the bigger part of the investment
22
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
NFA/GDP
Data
Both
TFP
Premium
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
Investment/GDP
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Interest premium
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
GDP per hour
Figure 8: Productivity or nance: counterfactual simulations
decline.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the neoclassical growth model provided a good framework
to analyze the uneven convergence behavior of the Hungarian economy. In particular, empiri-
cally identied processes for productivity and the external interest premium are sucient driving
forces to explain the medium-term growth performance of Hungary before and after the global
nancial crisis. Overall, the slowdown in TFP convergence is responsible for the sustained slug-
gish growth in GDP per hour. To understand the behavior of investment and the net foreign
asset position, however, interest premium developments are crucial.
The model simplies along two important dimensions. First, it abstract away from the pub-
lic sector and the role of EU funds that are important to understand short-run uctuations in
investment behavior. Second, we do not endogenize labor supply, which would be useful to ex-
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plain GDP per capita growth (as opposed to GDP per hours). Both extensions present numerous
challenges that we plan to take up in future work.
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